Deleting group members safely and efficiently has been a hot research issue in the field of the group signature. Some resolutions have been proposed by cryptography experts, but in some way, problems like loophole and low efficiency have been confusing us in the research. To solve the problem, the writers try to give a new secret key updating algorithm based on improving Wang Shangping's group members deleting scheme, and analyze the safety and efficiency of implementation systematically in the paper.
Introduction
Group signature [1] has drawn much attention in academy of cryptography since it was proposed in 1991; group signature scheme [2] proposed by Camenisch Stadler in 1997 was an important progress in group signature analysis. The scheme used knowledge signature concept (especially SKROOTLOG signature and SKLOGLOG signature). E. Bresson and J. Stern proposed a solution scheme of group members deleting problem in 2001 [3] , which was developed from Camenisch Stadler group signature scheme. It must be proved that public key z must not be in the list of deleting public keys with zero-knowledge when signers signed on the message M . The number of evidence in signature grows in a linear way with the growth of number of the deleted objects, so it is not suitable for large groups. Wang Shangping proposed a new solution to group members deleting problem in the Camenisch Stadler group signature scheme [4] . When new members join in the group or the existing members are deleted from the group, group manager calculates a new group feature key G U and update operator U , then member's secret characteristics key gets updates. The group public key has nothing to do with the number of group members. Literature [5, 6] analyzes the mathematical principle of parameters selection in the group signature members deleting scheme [4] , and it proves that Wang Shangping's scheme can't delete members in an actual way but proving process is not given. Inspired by some research results such as group signature [1, 7] , blind signature [8, 9] , authentication encryption signature [10, 11] and proxy signature, based on Wang Shangping's scheme, by converting secret feature key update operator public into secret when members are registered or deleted, the update process was executed by group manager instead of group members, a new group member's deleting scheme is proposed, in which secret feature key of group members will not change with members' deleting or joining.
A Novel Scheme

Foundation
Group manager is just the same as it in Camenisch-Stadler scheme in system setup phase, the difference is that we add a RSA public parameter e whose module is n , and e must coprime with ( ) n φ . Group public key is , ,
in the initial establishment. Group public feature key is
z is the public key of group member (1 1) i m ≤ ≤ − , and
Members' Joining In
If Alice wants to join the group, she can establish her member certificate first, just as registering in Camenisch Stadler's scheme [3] . Set Alice is the m -th member m G . Set group current public feature key
z is public key of the group members (1 1) i m ≤ ≤ − , and
. The group manager calculates the following value:
1) The new group public feature key and new value of k : to judge whether the secret feature key G U sent by group manager is correct.
Members' Deleting
Members' deleting is an inverse process of members' joining in. The following will explain how a group manager deletes the member j G . Group manager deletes its public key j G z which is in group public feature key G U , and changes the random number, then releases the new group public feature key G U and new value of k , and calculates the secret feature key update factor U and secret feature key of other group members, thus, we can generate a valid group signature after deleting j G .
Set current group public feature key as:
. In order to delete group member j G , group manager calculates the following value: 1) The new group public feature key and new value of k
2) The secret feature key update factor of group members
3) The secret feature key of ( )
Group manager makes a new group public feature key G U and new value of k public, keeps update factor U secret, and sends secret key privately to 
Signature Process
We can suppose that group has the legal members 1 
signs on message M on the behalf of the group. i G calculates 
Analysis of the Scheme
Verificating and Opening the Signature
When we verify the correctness of the signature, we just need to add verifying the establishment of 
Security and Efficiency Analysis of the Scheme
1) The calculation method of group public feature key is the same as it is in Wang Shangping's scheme, but the legal members' secret feature key is calculated by group manager, and then sent to members confidentially.
2) The deleted members cannot obtain the formula to update his secret feature key, even if conspiring with other members, it is impossible to forge signature that can be admitted.
3) It inherits the fine features of the Camenisch Stadler's scheme; furthermore, it can delete group members effectively.
4) It needs to calculate the new value of k when deleting or adding member, especially when we determine the formula of new member's secret feature key according to the current value of k when adding a new member. These lower the signature and verification efficiency, but the zero-knowledge proof process is eliminated compared to Bresson-Stern scheme [3] . In other words, the improvement scheme is safe, reliable, and high efficient.
